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Resumo: Este trabalho discute a tese da ‘situacionalidade’ da pesquisa em linguística, 
quer teórica, quer aplicada, e algumas das suas implicações. E sustenta que ela está ligada 
à performatividade de todas as asserções, inclusive as asserções científicas. De forma mais 
importante, argumento que é a regressão infinita da performatividade que torna inevitável 
a passagem da pesquisa presumivelmente ‘não influenciada por emoções’ à militância.
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Abstract: This paper discusses the claim of the situatedness of research in both theoretical 
and applied linguistics and some of its implications and argues that it is linked to the 
performativity of all assertions, including scientific ones. More importantly, I argue that it 
is the regressive infinity of performativity that makes inevitable the passage from presumably 
‘dispassionate’ research to militancy. 
Key-words: situatedness – performativity – linguistics – research.
THE BROAD OUTLINE OF THIS PAPER AND ITS PRINCIPAL AIMS 
Science has long prided itself on its oft-repeated claims of being 
atemporal and not spatially confined. It is widely and persistently held that 
scientific truths, once established, are there for ever—valid, that is, until 
the moment they are dislodged and replaced by other (more scientific?) 
truths. Philosophers of science usually frame these occasional ‘cataclysms’ 
within the trajectory of particular sciences, not in terms of science itself 
learning to be more ‘scientific’ with fresh discoveries. Rather, they see it as 
progressive approximations to an as-yet-undiscovered ‘final truth’, whose 
existence itself is never called into question, despite lack of certainty of ever 
having attained it or being able to do so. Both Popperians and Kuhnians, 
who are otherwise at loggerheads with one another on almost every other 
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issue, seem to uphold such a view of science unanimously. Both are, in this 
sense, die-hard positivists. And, it is not difficult to verify that, by and large, 
linguistics fits the bill. At the very least, that was very much the case until 
very recently. But some changes are there already on the horizon.
In this paper, my central aim is to discuss the importance of the growing 
realization among researchers, especially those in the social sciences, that 
theirs is an activity that is inescapably situated in time and space. This 
means that both scientific thinking and those who are engaged in the 
activity have their specific spatiotemporal coordinates and can only be 
judged relative to them. Among the several implications of this perception, 
I want to single out the inevitability of our personal involvement in our 
research projects and trace it ultimately to the performative character of our 
scientific assertions and, more importantly, the regressive infinity of such 
a claim. I further argue that this, in its turn, has the further consequence 
that our research always has an immediate impact on our lives as well as 
the lives of those around us, a point that may not be all that self-evident 
to many. I conclude by arguing that it is time we took these conclusions in 
their stride and accepted the fact that some form of militancy in the cause 
of those about whose lives we conduct our research is not something we 
might embark on after we have done our jobs as researchers, but something 
that must be regarded as part and parcel of our very jobs. In what follows, 
I shall initially take up the themes of situatedness and performativity of 
our scientific claims separately before weaving them together to form a 
single thread by linking these concepts to that of reflexivity.
SITUATEDNESS OF RESEARCH AND ITS OPPOSITION TO CATEGORICAL 
THINKING AND OBJECTIVISM 
The word ‘situated’ and its cognate ‘situatedness’ have gained some 
currency in the linguistic literature in recent years, especially in those areas 
considered the privileged site for applied research. It is opposed, on the 
one hand, to categorical thinking that has been the hallmark of rationalist 
tradition for centuries—the one that swept across linguistics with the 
Chomskyan revolution in the late 1950s—and on the other, to objectivism 
that informed a good deal of thinking on metaphysics, epistemology, ethics 
and so on, especially in the first half of 20th century. 
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Categorical thinking manifests itself in the widely attested penchant 
for positing radical, all-or-nothing dichotomous oppositions against 
mounting evidence of a reality composed of fuzzy categories or zones of grey, 
overlapping categories between the extremities of a cline. In linguistics, traces 
of categorical thinking can be discerned every time a linguist confidently 
affirms the existence of a language x as different from a language y, spoken in 
geographically contiguous areas (borderlands between countries, for example) 
or refers to a speaker as a native speaker of x rather than of y, whereas in 
reality the language community where that speaker lives is best described as 
societally multilingual. (Khubchandani, 2003). It is just this form of thinking 
that Pennycook (2002: 12) calls into question when he emphasizes the “need 
to ask hard questions about what we mean by ‘language’ and what different 
concepts, ideologies, or discourses we mobilize by particular constructions of 
the term.” Pennycook’s questioning of accepted orthodoxy in thinking about 
language was more recently taken up by Blackledge and Creese (2008: 552) 
who concluded their paper with the following remark: 
The young people’s attitudes to their languages, and their multilingual practices, 
constituted a sophisticated response to their place in the world, as they negotiated 
subject positions which took them on a path through language ideological worlds 
constructed by others. The young people were flexible and adaptable in response 
to their environment, as they negotiated identities which were more complex and 
sophisticated than the ‘heritage’ positions ascribed to them institutionally. 
On their part, Kramsch and Whiteside (2008: 643) chime in:
[…] the increasingly multilingual and multicultural nature of global exchanges is 
raising questions about the traditionally monolingual and monocultural nature of 
language education, and its modernist orientation.
As for objectivism, many linguists implicitly uphold this doctrine in 
their belief that the object of their inquiry, namely language, can be observed 
in complete disregard for the society at large or the cultural context. It is 
implicit, for instance, in the attitude of linguists like Frederick Newmeyer 
who defends tooth and nail what he calls ‘autonomism’ as an approach to 
the study of language. Here’s how he defines it:
(The advocates of autonomism) approach language as a natural scientist would study 
a physical phenomenon, that is, by focusing on those of its properties that exist 
apart from either the beliefs and values of the individual speakers of language or 
the nature of the society in which the language is spoken (Newmeyer, 1986: 5–6).
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Heller (2008:505) addresses this very issue but responds to it in a 
starkly different way when she says:
Indeed, if we are asking questions about what it means these days to try to understand 
what language and social process have to do with each other, it is not because the 
goal now seems meaningless, but rather because the tools we have inherited are 
encountering some of their built-in limitations in current confrontations with the 
way things are unfolding in the world around us, confounding our attempts to 
understand them. 
In one swift stroke of the pen, thus, she addresses the pressing need 
of the moment to contemplate language in conjunction with the society 
which is where it is embedded while also drawing attention to the topicality 
of the very need to raise the issue.
Autonomism is antipodal to the thesis of situatedness. It arises from 
the misguided belief that it is possible for a researcher to free themselves 
of the particularities of the historical moment at which they happen to 
be located in order to get hold of overarching, perennial truths about the 
nature of things. The foolhardiness of this belief is especially striking as 
we contemplate objects like ‘language’ that are themselves products of 
our discursive practices about them. For the truth of the matter is that 
there are no such things as languages in natura, ready for the linguists to 
pounce upon and dissect. As Herman (2008: 93) says: “When we talk 
metaphorically of language as a ‘thing’ or a ‘structure’, we are using a 
‘systematically misleading expression’ (Ryle, 1931)”. In other words, as 
Makoni and Pennycook (2007: 1) argue, languages, as we know them 
today, were actually “invented” through the process of classification and 
naming. Now, many dyed-in-the-wool linguists might object that such 
an act of reification or, in plain English, ‘thingification,’ is a necessary first 
step without which no science would ever be possible. But the following 
remark by Love (2009: 30) should give them some pause to think:
Since the mid-19th century Western linguistics has prided itself on being the ‘science 
of language’. One important consequence of this self-designation is that linguistics 
projects an image of itself as culture-neutral, in the sense that physics, chemistry and 
biology are culture-neutral. That is to say, while no would deny that Western science 
is the product of a particular culture, its findings, if true, are held to be universally 
true. The laws of physics do not cease to hold in those parts of the world where 
the inhabitants’ intellectual history is such that they could not have formulated 
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them for themselves. The facts vouchsafed by the science of human physiology are 
what they are, even for those who have no inkling for them. Is linguistics culturally 
neutral in this sense?
The very fact that we do speak of, say, a distinctively French as opposed 
to British or Polish linguistics, not to mention an Indian or a Chinese 
linguistics, should be seen as definitively forcing upon us a flat “no” as the 
answer to this question. The reason why it is perfectly reasonable to speak 
of British linguistics as different from, say, French linguistics is that the 
kind of research carried out under the respective banners reflect the general 
features that have been long characteristic of their national thinking. Thus 
we readily recognize Firth, Halliday and so forth as British for, among other 
things, their empirical bent of mind, their preference for the concrete and 
down-to-earth facts of language and so forth. As historians who have looked 
at the evolution of linguistics over the centuries have shown, the questions 
that linguists have raised, and the ways in which they have gone about 
answering them at specific moments in history, bear the indelible marks 
of their cultural milieu as well as historically relevant issues.  
As for categorical thinking and objectivism, they have been the bedrock 
on which the modern science of language or linguistics was erected and 
are still touted by those who would rather have their science looked upon 
as one of the ‘hard sciences’ (alongside, say, physics and chemistry) than 
the so-called human sciences (like sociology and anthropology). Rampton 
(1997) summed up the spirit of situatedness very nicely when he wrote:
Researchers can’t help being socially located, with biographies and subjectivities 
that are brought to bear at every stage of the research process, influencing in some 
form or another the questions they ask and the way they try to find the answers. 
(Rampton 1997: 11).   
Rampton made that observation with the field of research called 
‘Applied Linguistics’ (AL) specifically in mind. The term ‘situatedness’ has, 
it seems, caught on. In Brazil, it was put to efficient use when Signorini 
(2008) used it in the very title of the first of her diptych Investigações sobre 
Lingu[gem] situada (Studies on situated language). As she made it clear in 
her editorial preface to the volume, to talk of language as situated is to 
see it as part of a wider, social reality on the one hand and to prepare the 
grounds for a critical, interventionist role for the researcher on the other. It 
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takes no great flight of imagination to realize that to contemplate language 
as part of a wider, social reality is to problematize the terms in which its 
contours have been delineated traditionally, while to espouse a critical and 
openly interventionist role of the researcher is to abdicate any claims to 
disinterestedness and objectivity.
The idea of situatedness is, no doubt, particularly evident and appealing 
in so-called applied fields as Rampton rightly observed. The kinds of problems 
that researchers in AL address are typically located in space and time, usually 
coinciding with the spatiotemporal coordinates of their own existence. It is 
temporally located in the sense that what presents itself as a problem today 
may cease to be a problem tomorrow; or, even more dramatically, may turn 
out to be just the solution to some other, hitherto undetected problem. It is 
spatially located inasmuch as a problem identified as such in a given set of 
circumstances may not be all that problematic elsewhere, or, even turn to 
be a blessing in disguise in some other situation. Also, as Rampton rightly 
pointed out, researchers themselves can only contemplate those problems 
that are not only there in the real world, but are, more significantly, the 
ones that the theoretical baggage they bring to the task enables them to see. 
This observation became all-too-evident and undeniably true especially in 
light of what scholars like Hanson (1958) and later Thomas S. Kuhn (1962) 
and Paul Feyerabend (1981a, b) have convincingly argued: namely, that all 
observations are, in the ultimate analysis, theory-laden.  
Now, contrary to what some commentators have hastily gone on to 
conclude, the thesis of theory-ladenness of empirical observations is not an 
apology for a theory-first research strategy, nor for that matter for a return 
to stock-in-trade rationalism as the only viable means to arrive at scientific 
truths. In a paper entitled ‘The philosophy of applied linguistics’ which I 
wrote a decade ago (Rajagopalan, 2003), I claimed that what one witnesses 
as one surveys the current academic scenario is a return to empiricism in 
the form of what is best referred to as neo-empiricism (that is a new form 
of empiricism, shorn of its original naïveté and behaviorist overlays). In 
a review of the edited volume in which that paper was published (Davies 
and Elder 2003), James Lantoff (2006: 151) observed:
Perhaps the most controversial claim in the entire volume occurs in the previously 
mentioned chapter by Rajagopalan, who perceives an “unmistakable” and 
“irreversible” trend toward neo-empiricism in applied linguistics. According to the 
author, with the possible exception of SLA scholars, such as the “unrepentant” Gregg 
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[Rajagopalan’s term], researchers are ‘becoming convinced that the theory-first 
approach has only stood in the way of real progress in the field (p. 412)’.
I confess I fail to see why my claim is described as so very controversial. 
As far I can see, the growing prestige of corpus linguistics which I cited 
as proof for my claim undeniably underscores a summary rejection of 
theorizing from the top, the hallmark of rationalism (see Chapman, 2008 
for a reiteration of this view). But a possible clue to why Lantoff thinks 
otherwise may be found in a passage from the same review where he 
dismisses the claim of corpus linguistics as “a theory of anything” and adds 
that it is only a “research methodology”. 
Once again, I confess I see things very differently. While it is no doubt 
true that corpus linguistics attracts a number of new computer-savvy 
enthusiasts thanks to its extensive use of computer technology, it is important 
to remember that it is neither predicated on nor confined to it. The best 
proof for this can be adduced from the fact that the idea of corpus-based 
studies itself predates the use of computers. In fact, the massive and laborious 
spadework that went into the production of the monumental volume A 
Comprehensive Grammar of the English Language (Quirk et. al, 1985)—often 
cited as an early demonstration of what can be achieved through the study 
of corpus—did not avail itself of any such technology for the simple reason 
that there was none available at that time. (Rajagopalan, 2007). Besides, 
as Thompson and Hunston (2006: 1-2) argue, the farthest one may go in 
distinguishing between a decidedly theoretical approach to language such 
as Systemic Functional Linguistics and Corpus linguistics is that the former 
is “theory-heavy” whereas the latter is “theory-light”. That is to say, it is 
theoretically oriented all right, but maybe not in any full-blooded sense. And 
in a particularly poignant way, it strikes at the very heart of the generativist 
conception of language (Rajagopalan, 2007). Were it not so, it would not be 
the lightning rod for so much blistering criticism from generative linguists, 
especially Chomsky. (see for example, Andor, 2004).  
SITUATEDNESS AND ITS IMPLACTIONS
Backtracking a little, it is important to point out that, in the past 
decade or so, a flurry of books and papers have highlighted the situatedness 
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of research even in areas primarily concerned with hard-core theorizing. 
Particularly worth mentioning here is the book Linguistics and the Third 
Reich: Mother-tongue fascism, race and the science of language by Christopher 
Hutton (Hutton, 1999). Hutton pointed out that 
Notions such as ‘mother-tongue’ and ‘native speaker’ are fundamental in 
contemporary formal as well as sociological linguistics, yet their status within 
organicist ideology and radical-nationalist identity politics is forgotten or ignored. 
At the very least it should be recognized that the rise of mother-tongues reflects a 
particular set of historical circumstances, not a transhistorical law of human identity 
formation. (Hutton, 1999: 287)
The importance of this observation can hardly be overestimated. 
Hutton is challenging nothing other than what has over the years become 
axiomatic in linguistics: namely, the idea that individual languages exist as 
such in natura and that they have their respective native speakers. Hutton’s 
timely reminder that they have their origins in organicist ideology and 
radical-nationalist identity politics—needless to say, a part and parcel of 
the Zeitgeist of what is mostly a bygone era today—must give us pause to 
consider the possibility that some of the building blocks of contemporary 
linguistic thought may themselves owe their existence to hidden interests 
of an ideological nature moulding linguistic thought in times past. 
When all is said and done, what the idea of the situatedness of all 
thinking on matters linguistic underscores is that, no matter how hard one 
might wish things were otherwise, there can be no escaping from the fact 
that we as researchers are unavoidably caught up in the particulars of the 
moment in history that we happen to be in as well as the circumstances–
social, political and what have you—that attend on it. 
Furthermore, our very presence as researchers is invariably intrusive 
and invasive, no matter how hard one pretends it isn’t. Rather than 
propose ingenious—and, in the end, self-deluding—measures to sidestep 
so-called ‘observer’s paradox’ or devise supplementary tricks to ameliorate 
its damaging effects (Labov, 1972), we as researchers should face up to the 
fact that the observer is inevitably part of the observed. It is not for nothing 
that the observer’s paradox has been likened to Heisenberg’s ‘uncertainty 
principle’. But it is doubtful whether in social sciences most researchers 
would take Einstein’s famous reaction ‘God doesn’t play dice’ for a 
conclusive answer to the dilemma and not simply a desperate plea to return 
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to a familiar rationalist dogma. Also, it is not obvious if Einstein has, in this 
case, done any better than Descartes and his so-called ontological proof for 
the existence of God and way out of his own path of skepticism.  
THE THESIS OF THE PERFORMATIVITY OF OUR SCIENTIFIC CLAIMS
The concept of performative utterances was famously put forward 
by the English philosopher J.L. Austin (1962), though the idea itself had 
probably been around for a much longer time (Nerlich and Clarke, 1994). 
What interests us here is the idea that the utterances we make primarily 
attest to certain actions we perform in or by speaking language. That is 
to say, behind every utterance, behind every language chunk which we 
think is concrete and self-sufficient unto itself, there is a speaking subject 
who intends that utterance to mean certain things or, at the very least, 
is credited with having such and such intentions (even dyed-in-the-wool 
Freudians would have to concede that that is how ordinary men and women 
go about conducting their routine business of life!).  
Although the thesis of performativity has been widely accepted by the 
scholarly community at large and percolated down to several disciplinary 
matrices (Rajagopalan, 2004a, 2009a), many have either failed or been 
reluctant to take its implications to their logical conclusions.  A notable 
exception is Beaugrande (1998). His opening words signal a significant 
change in the way many scholars have started looking at their own scientific 
practices. 
For analysing the discourses of philosophy and science, ‘speech act theory’ might offer 
a bridge metaphor. In ‘classical’ agendas, these discourses are officially dominated 
by the ‘constative’ mode for conveying information and declaring the truth about 
reality, but unofficially by the ‘performative’ mode for constructing reality and claiming 
authority. (Beugrande, 1998: 1)
And he went on to contrast traditional and contemporary approaches 
to the looking at scientific controversies;
Officially, disagreements occur only because the sole and complete truth is still 
unattained, or because individual philosophers or scientists are misled by personal 
interests or relativism. ‘Non-classical’ or ‘post-classical’ agendas are now seeking to 
reinterpret philosophy and science as performative enterprises, wherein a ‘theory’, 
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‘description’, or ‘explanation’ emerges from performative speech acts deriving 
authority from a superior rationality than your competitors or predecessors. 
(Beugrande, 1998: 1)
Beugrande’s approach is in stark contrast with that of Dascal (1989, 
1990) and Dascal and Cremaschi (1999) where a last-ditch, desperate 
attempt is made to safeguard the scientific objectivity of science by creating 
a straw-man distinction between a ‘soft rationality’ and a ‘hard one’. In 
Rajagopalan (2002), I argued why such attempts are doomed to fail because 
they only skirt the problem rather than confronting it head-on. Moreover, 
they belong to a series of attempts to ‘contain’ Austin, to literally ‘reinvent’ 
him and control the potential damages that may accrue from Ordinary 
Language Philosophy, the best-known example of which is Searle’s efforts 
to put Austin’s thoughts on the beaten track of analytic philosophy (Cf. 
Rajagopalan, 2000, 2004b, 2009a, 2010). 
EPISTEMOLOGICAL DEAD-END AND THE IDEA OF PERFORMATIVITY AS A 
WAY OUT
The theory of performativity poses a serious problem to the pretensions 
of classical science: if there are no constative utterances as such but only 
performatives ingeniously camouflaged so as to look like them, where does 
it leave us insofar the question of scientific truth is concerned? Here is how 
Austin prepares us for the final coup de grace:
With the constative utterance, we abstract from the illocutionary (let alone the 
perlocutionary) aspects of the speech act, and we concentrate on the locutionary: 
moreover, we use an over-simplified notion of correspondence with the facts-over-
simplified because essentially it brings in the illocutionary aspect. (Austin, 1962: 
144-145)
Austin is saying that any attempt to infer rock-bottom truths from 
constative utterances is precipitous and ill-advised because (a) we are 
forgetting that the constative that we are appealing to was itself wrenched 
out of the illocutionary and (b) the notion of correspondence that we are 
using is “over-simplified”. Does it mean it is high time we dumped the 
whole notion of the constative utterance overboard and started looking for 
an alternative? One thing is for sure: what investigations such as Austin’s 
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have shown beyond the shadow of a doubt is that we can no longer continue 
doing science the way Descartes idealized it. There is some make-believe 
in all this. We have to pretend as if the constative can be entrusted with 
the task of being the bearer of truth-values.
What this also underscores is the need for giving up on the assumption 
that all scientific enquiry must follow a path that has a point zero at its 
beginning. The fact that there is no point zero in matters of scientific 
enquiry. All our starting premises are vestiges of past attempts. The path 
itself has not been laid out for us beforehand; rather, we make it by walking. 
(Rajagopalan, 2011). In other words, even when we as scientists think that 
we are working alone, we are in fact societally positioned and cannot help 
being so. This was the great epistemological trap to which Descartes, the 
great French savant, fell victim.
For Descartes, the ‘Father of Modern Philosophy’, theoretical reflection 
was a profoundly solitary affair. The idea that all theoretical reflection 
should start with a ‘clean slate’— incidentally, the corner-stone of modern 
linguistics (cf. Rajagopalan, 2004c)—was also announced early on in his 
Passions of the Soul, when he declared pompously that his plan was to broach 
the topic “as if no one had written on these matters before”. To appreciate 
just how far we have moved from that Cartesian orthodoxy, consider the 
following remark by Restivo (1988: 5):
Even when I carry out scientific work—an activity which I can seldom conduct in 
direct association with other men—I perform a social, because human, act. It is not only 
the material of my activity—like the language itself which the thinker uses—which is 
given to me as a social product. My own existence itself is a social activity.
Essentially the same point is reiterated by Livnat (2012: 1) when he 
claims:
The academic scholar, even if he feels that in certain respects he is a “one-man show,” 
is part of a shared and ongoing endeavor, and his scientific work is asocial act that 
exists within a framework of agreed-upon social mechanisms.  
The fact remains, however, that linguistics is still a long away from 
recognizing that there is an inalienable social dimension to language 
(Rajagopalan, 2006, 2009b). Stephen May (2006) attributes this inability 
(or sheer reluctance, whatever one may want to call it) to the navel-gazing 
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attitude of many contemporary linguists. He does not exempt even 
sociolinguists who, he believes, are at one with their mainstream colleagues 
on this question, notwithstanding their professed interest in and enthusiasm 
for the social context of language. This is what he has to say:  
[…] for much of its history, linguistics as an academic discipline has been preoccupied 
with idealist, abstracted approaches to the study of language. In short, language 
has too often been examined in isolation from the social and political conditions 
in which it is used. . . . This ahistorical, apolitical approach to language has also been a 
feature of sociolinguistics, despite its emphasis on the social, and of many discussions of LP 
[language policy] as well. (emphasis added) (May 2006: 255)
PERFORMATIVITY AND ITS INFINITE REGRESS THROUGH REFLEXIVITY
While more and more scholars today have taken kindly to the idea 
that there is no escaping from the fact of all language being performative 
through and through, many still have great difficulty in accepting the 
consequences of such a conclusion in their entirety. In particular, many are 
still struggling to face up to the inevitable consequence that the thesis of 
peformativity leads us into an infinite regress (Rajagopalan, 2010: 15). To 
see why this is so, consider the following. To say that a given utterance is 
a performative one, despite all appearance to the contrary (which, after all, 
was the gist of Austin’s groundbreaking thesis) is itself to produce another 
performative utterance; but to point out verbally that this is so is to produce 
yet another performative utterance in turn. And so on, ad infinitum. This is 
but another way of admitting that there is no stepping out of language to 
make a statement about it, as it were, from a perspective located outside of 
language. Yet another way of putting the same thing would be to say that 
there is no escape from the all-encompassing grip of language; no matter 
how hard one might try, one is always already caught up in it. 
Note that the unending process of stepping back only to discover 
that each time we are back in the grip of performativity (only at a further 
remove each time from the one immediately preceding it) is something 
that passes through what has been called reflexivity. Now the idea of 
reflexivity is nothing but the recognition that what one says at any time 
must apply to one’s very saying of it, over and above the ‘content’ of that 
saying. But, once again, it is one thing to nod in agreement to this but 
another to face up to its ultimate implications. Werry draws attention to 
this when he observes:
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Modern linguistics consists of many disparate, competing, and sometimes deeply 
conflicting approaches to the study of language. Yet until very recently, what has 
characterized almost all forms of linguistic inquiry has been the absence of attention to 
linguistic discourse itself, to reflexive, rhetorical selfconsciousness about the language 
of linguistics. Unlike fields such as economics, social psychology, philosophy, sociology, 
anthropology and history, that have undergone a ‘‘rhetorical turn,’’ linguistics has 
shown little inclination to look ‘‘at’’ as well as ‘‘through’’ its disciplinary discourses 
(Werry, 2007: 67)
As a matter of fact, linguistics was founded on the gesture of 
suppressing all traces of rhetoric, a gesture whose roots date back to at 
least as early as Plato. Referring to the eternal ‘tussle’ between logic and 
rhetoric, Schalkwyk (2004: 99) says:
A dichotomy established since Plato’s attack on the Sophists, this separation has been 
under pressure recently from literary theorists and some continental philosophers, 
who insist upon the inescapably situational nature of all enquiry and argument.
It should not take a very great stretch of the imagination to realize 
that this total lack of “rhetorical selfconsciousness”, of preparedness or 
willingness on the part of linguists to ‘look ‘‘at’’ as well as ‘‘through’’’ its 
disciplinary discourses”, that Werry speaks of results in the disciplinary 
discourse of linguistics becoming more and more hermetic and proof against 
possible ‘prying eyes’ from the outside. 
Here we are up against the eternal lure of theorizing for the sake of 
theorizing. Now, clearly many researchers have expressed their despair over 
this issue of theory for theory’s sake, no matter what the consequences. 
It was this pent-up frustration that led van Lier to exclaim, apropos of 
language teaching and the spate of theory after ingenious theory being 
churned out, that “the linguistics in AL has veered off in the direction of 
theory (in a sense, therefore, has left AL), leaving pedagogy to cope with 
the practical side of things” (van Lier 1994). It reminds one of a standing 
joke that used to be told about dried-in-the-wool Marxists, a fanatic among 
whom exclaims “It may well work in practice; but in theory, well …” 
An equally personal account of the revulsion one justifiably feels when 
a scholar openly disparages actual life experiences in order to focus on high-
falutin’ theory was recently given by Li Wei (2007) in a ‘Viewpoint’ piece 
in International Journal of Applied Linguistics where he wrote:
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[The other day] I attended a research seminar by a linguist who presented a model 
of the bilingual mind. The speaker actually said, repeatedly, that the model was a 
“theoretical” one and did not (intend to) have anything to do with how bilinguals 
actually think or what they do. Indeed, she argued that having facts about the 
actual behaviour of the language user from observation would be a distraction 
from important theorization. In her own words, “the idiosyncratic behaviour of the 
speaker is a real nuisance for the scientist”. I realised that we are still a long way 
from a user-centred linguistics.
I would go farther than that. There is an urgent need, I think, to 
humanize a good part of linguistics, to make it socially meaningful and 
relevant. And one important first step in embarking on such an agenda is 
to recognize that all our thinking is invariably situated. We are, after all, 
all human, all too human. There is indeed nothing wrong with that nor 
anything to be ashamed about. Or, even if there is, there is nothing we can 
do about that—all we can do is just grin and bear it! 
RESEARCHERS AS MILITANTS
The situatedness of all linguistic thought, coupled with the inalienable 
performativity of all our scientific claims means that researchers in human 
sciences cannot help being also militants in the causes they embrace in 
whatever way, shape or form. Militancy is but the straightforward outcome 
of the fact that to speak a language is always already to intervene in the state 
of affairs that contributes to making our world what it is. This was the crucial 
fact unfortunately sidestepped by Marx (1888: 13) when he proclaimed: 
“The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point 
is to change it.” Marx recommended the right pill for the malaise he had 
detected; but he diagnosed it incorrectly. Because he failed to recognize that 
all interpretation can only take place in language and speaking a language 
necessarily implies intervening in the world in decisive ways. 
The same holds true in the case of linguists and other social scientists 
who have taken up the task of trying to understand the workings of human 
language. Whether they are willing to admit it or not, their work is already 
one form of intervening in the very phenomenon they are looking at. True, 
in the past they used to delude themselves by thinking that they could 
describe language, while withholding their impulse to prescribe specific usages. 
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But thanks to Austin and others, we know now that description is but 
another name for constativity and that pure constativity is but a mirage! 
So the earlier linguists admit the inalienable performativity of their own 
work, the better.   
In point of fact, the politics of militancy is not option but a natural 
corollary of their work as researchers. Mey (1985: 16) announced this in a 
very pithy but powerful observation when he said:  
[…] our use of language cements the dominant interests of our society, helping to 
oppress a large segment of the population.
The full political significance of that statement can only be appreciated 
by perceiving its covert illocutionary force (Rajagopalan, 2009b). It turns 
out Mey was issuing a clarion call to his colleagues to join him in the crusade 
to fight on behalf of those left on the seamy side of linguistically inscribed 
social divides all over the world. 
Before wrapping up this paper, I would like to mention the growing, 
but as yet very timid, disquiet amongst our ranks about the wide chasm 
that separates our ‘lofty’ academic discourse from the routine, ‘myth-laden’ 
speech of the ‘hoi-polloi’—and the attendant belief that it is a sheer waste 
of time trying to ‘educate’ the masses at large about the breakthroughs of 
our scientific enquiry. Cameron (2007b: 294) asks:  
How do you make our research, with all its complexities and uncertainties, accessible 
and entertaining enough to keep the reader on board, without committing what 
academics are trained to think of as the cardinal sin of ‘dumbing down’? I suspect 
that many of us shy away from popular writing because we fear we may commit 
that sin, or be accused of it by our peers.
Cameron’s own book The Myth of Mars and Venus (Cameron 2007a) 
was an attempt to redeem “some of my ingrained professional prejudices”, 
as was, in a much more modest fashion, my own attempt to address the 
issue in Rajagopalan 2004c. 
When all is said and done, the one question we all have to answer 
sooner or later is: What difference does our research make to the real world 
and have we done anything to make it matter to the daily lives of those 
most urgently need it? 
FINAL_COR_PRF_DELTA_28-1_MIOLO.indd   99 14/10/2012   14:49:46
100 D.E.L.T.A., 28:1 
Acknowlegements: 
I am grateful to the CNPq for funding my research project. (Process 
no. 304557/2006-4)
Recebido em janeiro de 2012
Aprovado em março de 2012
E-mail: rajagopalan@uol.com.br
REFERENCES
ANDOR, Joseph. 2004. The master and his performance: An interview with 
Noam Chomsky. Intercultural Pragmatics 1-1: 93–111.
AUSTIN, John Langshaw. 1962. How to Do Things with Words. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press.
BEAUGRANDE, Robert de. 1998. Performative speech acts in linguistic theory: 
The rationality of Noam Chomsky. Journal of Pragmatics 29: 1-39.
BLACKLEDGE, Adrian and CREESE, Angela. 2008. Contesting ‘language’ as 
‘heritage’:
negotiation of identities in late modernity. Applied Linguistics 29/4: 533–
554.
CAMERON, Deborah 2007a. The myth of Mars and Venus. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 17/3: 392 – 395.
______. 2007b. Applied linguistics and the perils of popularity. International 
Journal of Applied linguistics. 17.3: 392–395.
CHAPMAN, Siobhan. 2008. Language and Empiricism, After the Vienna Circle. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
DASCAL, Marcelo. 1989. Controversies as quase-dialogues. In Weigand, 
E. and Hundsnurscher, F. (eds.) 1989. Dialoganalyse. II. Tübingen: 
Niemeyer. 147-159.
______. 1990. The controversy about ideas and the idea of controversy. In 
Fernando Gil (ed.) Controvérsias Científicas e Filosóficas. Lisboa: Editora 
Fragmentos. 61-100.
______ e Cremaschi, Sergio 1999. The Malthus-Ricardo correspondence: 
sequential structure, argumentative patterns, and rationality. Journal 
of Pragmatics. 31: 1129-1172.  
DAVIES, Alan and Elder, Katherine (eds). 2003. The Handbook of Applied 
Linguistics. New York: Blackwell.
FINAL_COR_PRF_DELTA_28-1_MIOLO.indd   100 14/10/2012   14:49:46
 RAJAGOPALAN: PERFORMATIVITY AND THE CLAIMS OF SCIENTIFICITY... 101
FEYERABEND, Paul K. 1981a. Realism, Rationalism, and Scientific Method: 
Philosophical Papers. Volume 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
______. 1981b. Problems of Empiricism: Philosophical Papers. Volume 2. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
HANSON, N.R. 1958.Patterns of Discovery. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
HELLER, Monica 2008. ‘Language and the nation-state: challenges to 
sociolinguistic theory and practice’. Journal of Sociolinguistics. 12/4: 
504 – 524.
HERMANN, Jesper 2008. ‘The language problem’. Language and 
Communication. 28. pp. 93 – 99. 
HUTTON, Christopher. M. 1999. Linguistics and the Third Reich: Mother-tongue 
fascism, race and the science of language. London: Routledge.
KHUBCHANDANI, L. M. 2003. Defining mother tongue education in 
plurilingual contexts. Language Policy 2: 239–254. 
KRAMSCH, Claire and WHITESIDE, Anne. 2008. Language ecology in 
multilingual settings. towards a theory of symbolic competence. Applied 
Linguistics. 29/4: 645–671. 
KUHN, Thomas S. 1962. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press.
LABOV, William. 1972. Sociolinguistic Patterns. Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press.
LANTOFF, James. 2006. Review of The Handbook of Applied Linguistics by 
Davies. A & Elder, K. (eds). Applied Linguistics. 27. 1: 147- 152.
LIVNAT, Zohar 2012. Dialogue, Science and Academic Writing. Amsterdam: 
John Benjamins Publishing Company.
LOVE, Nigel 2009. Science, language and linguistic culture. Language & 
Communication. 29: 26–46
MAKONI, Sinfree and Pennycook, Alastair (eds). 2007. Desinventing and 
Reconstituting Languages. Clevedon: Multilingual Matters.
MARX, Karl. 1888. ‘Theses On Feuerbach.’ (Appendix to Ludwig Feuerbach 
and the End of Classical German Philosophy). Marx/Engels Selected Works. 
Vol. One. Moscow: Progress Publishers.
MAY, Stephen. 2006. ‘Language policy and minority rights’ in T. Ricento 
(ed.): An Introduction to Language Policy: Theory and Method. Malden, 
MA: Blackwell, pp. 255–72.
MEY, Jacob L. 1985. Whose Language: A Study in Linguistic Pragmatics. 
Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
FINAL_COR_PRF_DELTA_28-1_MIOLO.indd   101 14/10/2012   14:49:46
102 D.E.L.T.A., 28:1 
NERLICH, B. and Clarke, David D. 1994. Language, action, and context: 
Linguistic pragmatics in Europe and America (1800-1950). Journal of 
Pragmatics 22: 439-463.
NEWMEYER, Frederick. J. 1986. The Politics of Linguistics. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press.
PENNYCOOK, Alasdair. 2002. Mother tongues, governmentality, and 
protectionism. International Journal of the Sociology of Language. 154: 
11–28. 
QUIRK, R., Svartvik, J., Leech, G. and Greenbaum, S. 1985. A Comprehensive 
Grammar of the English Language. London: Longman. 
RAJAGOPALAN, Kanavillil. 2002. Science, rhetoric, and the sociology of 
knowledge: a critique of Dascal’s view of scientific controversies. 
Manuscrito - Revista Internacional de Filosofia. XXV. 2: 433-464.
______. 2003. The philosophy of applied linguistics. In: Davies, A. e Elder, 
K. (eds.). The Handbook of Applied Linguistics. New York: Blackwell 
Publishers. 397-420. 
______. (2004a). John Langshaw Austin. In: Strazny, P. (ed.) Encyclopedia of 
Linguistics.New York, EUA: Fitzroy Dearborn.  Vol. 1. pp. 98-100.
______. 2004b. John Searle. In: Strazny, P. (ed.) Encyclopedia of Linguistics. 
New York,  EUA: Fitzroy Dearborn.  Vol. 2: 936-938.
______. 2004c. Resposta aos meus debatedores. In: Lopes da Silva, F. e 
Rajagopalan, K. (eds.) A Lingüística que Nos Faz Falhar. São Paulo: 
Parábola. 166-231.
______.  2006. Social Aspects of Pragmatics. In: Keith Brown, (Editor-in-
Chief) Encyclopedia of Language & Linguistics, Second Edition. 11:434-440. 
Oxford: Elsevier.
______. 2007. A lingüística de corpus no tempo e no espaço: visão reflexiva. 
In: Gerber, R. M. e Vasilévski, V. (eds.). Um Percurso para Pesquisas com 
Base em Corpus. Florianópolis, SC: Ed. da UFSC. 23-44.
______. 2009a. Ordinary language philosophy. In: Chapman, Siobhan and 
Christopher. Routledge. (eds.) Key Ideas in Linguistics and the Philosophy 
of Language. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 149 – 145.
______. 2009b.  Pragmatics today: from a component of linguistics to 
a perspective of language. In: Fraser, Bruce and Turner, Ken. (eds). 
Language in Life, and a Life in Language: Jacob Mey – A Festschrift. London: 
Emerald Group. pp.335 – 341.
RAMPTON, M. B. H. (1997). Retuning in applied linguistics. International 
Journal of Applied Linguistics. 7. pp.3-25.
FINAL_COR_PRF_DELTA_28-1_MIOLO.indd   102 14/10/2012   14:49:46
 RAJAGOPALAN: PERFORMATIVITY AND THE CLAIMS OF SCIENTIFICITY... 103
______. 2010.  Nova Pragmática. São Paulo: Parábola. 
______. 2011.  Prospects for language studies in our era of globalization. 
In: Kitis, Eliza et. al. (Orgs.). Selected Papers - ISTAL 19. Thessaloniki, 
Greece: Monochroma Publishing. 43-49.
RESTIVO, Saul. 1988. The social life of mathematics. Philosophica. 42: 
5-20.
RYLE, Gilbert 1931/2. Systematically misleading expressions. Proceedings of 
the Aristotelian Society. XXXII: 139-70.
SCHALKWYK, David. 2005. A report to the academy: Talbot Taylor and the 
rhetorical roots of contemporary language theory. Language Sciences 
27: 97–112.
SIGNORINI, Inês. 2008. Investigações sobre linguagem situada. São Paulo: 
Parábola.
THOMPSON, Geoff and HUNSTON, Susan. 2006. System and Corpus: Exploring 
Connections. London: Equinox. 
VAN LIER, Leo. 1991. Doing applied linguistics: towards a theory of 
practice.’ Issues in Applied Linguistics. 28: 78-81.
______. 1994.  Educational linguistics: field and project. In Alatis, J.E. 
(ed.). Georgetown University Round Table on Language and Linguistics. 
Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press. 32-59.
WEI, Li. 2007. A user-friendly linguistics. International Journal of Applied 
Linguistics. 17. 1: 117-119.
WERRY, Chris. 2007. Reflections on language: Chomsky, linguistic discourse 
and the value of rhetorical self-consciousness. Language Sciences. 29: 
66–87.
FINAL_COR_PRF_DELTA_28-1_MIOLO.indd   103 14/10/2012   14:49:46
